Proof of Research

The headline

What we looked at

Both are verified on the Robinhood Chain explorer — the token contract as RewardsCoin and the hook as RewardsHook, both compiled with Solidity 0.8.26. Verified means the published source code has been confirmed to match the code actually running on-chain, so what you read is what executes.

The liquidity burn, proven

On Uniswap v4, a liquidity pool is controlled by an NFT. Whoever holds that NFT can withdraw the pool. Burn it, and the pool is locked forever, because a burn address has no owner and no keys.

Two transactions from launch day, eight minutes apart, tell the story:

1. 1 · The mint · 08 Jul 2026, 03:21 UTC

   Creates the liquidity position and issues Uniswap v4 Positions NFT #1679 to the deployer wallet 0x26D9E20b2603825fCf5A11D9f918562630198418.

   0xc63ff21a3e5788b409c5540bbe5e46bf31d2d666ff5a7de2600f77a2f4abe46d
2. 2 · The burn · 08 Jul 2026, 03:29 UTC

   Sends that same #1679 from the deployer to 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD, the standard dead address.

   0x43b41f1ebead210aed3067c50c2e84731b0bdc33d966527ddc0ae91eb446bd7d

Both transactions carry the same token ID — #1679. That check is the one most people skip, and it’s the one that matters. Plenty of projects point at a burn transaction that turns out to have burned a different asset entirely. Minting one position and burning another would look identical at a glance. Here the ID is the same on both sides, so the position that was created is the position that was destroyed.

The deployer wallet holds no Uniswap v4 position NFT today. You can confirm that yourself on its token transfer history — two ERC-721 rows, the mint in and the burn out, and nothing since.

The pool cannot be withdrawn. The key to it no longer exists.

Supply and launch

The full 1,000,000,000 supply was minted straight into the pool at launch — a single _mint in the constructor, and no mint function anywhere else in the contract. No team allocation, no premine, no vesting schedule, no tokens held back. Everyone bought from the same pool, at the same price, from block one.

The tax

5% on buys, 5% on sells, against a hardcoded ceiling of 5% that no one can raise, developer included. The rate can be lowered, never lifted past that ceiling.

That ceiling deserves a moment. A large share of tax-token rugs work by quietly raising the rate to 30, 50, 90 percent once people are holding. Here it’s not a promise or a policy. It’s a limit written into the contract:

uint256 public constant MAX_FEE_BPS = 500; // hard cap at 5%
...
require(_bps <= MAX_FEE_BPS, "Fee too high");

constant is the word doing the work. It is fixed at compile time and there is no function anywhere that can change it.

How rewards actually reach you

Every taxed trade sends ETH into the hook contract. Once it accumulates the distribution threshold — currently 0.2 ETH — it automatically buys the reward token on the open market and pushes it out to holders, split proportionally by how much you hold.

No minimum balance to qualify. No staking. No claiming required. Rewards arrive passively as trading happens, and you can also claim manually whenever you like.

Once rewards are credited to you, they’re recorded in the token contract, and no administrative function can remove them.

What the code makes impossible

This is the part worth reading twice. The owner cannot:

• ✕Mint new tokens
• ✕Blacklist wallets
• ✕Stop you selling
• ✕Raise the tax above 5%
• ✕Change the reward token in the token contract
• ✕Touch the liquidity pool
• ✕Take rewards you've already earned

Every one of those is blocked structurally, in code, not by trust.

Check it yourself

Everything above comes from public data. Open the Robinhood Chain explorer, paste in the token address, open the Contract tab to read the code, and look up the two transaction hashes above to see the mint and the burn.

Five minutes of your own verification beats any article, including this one.